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International Patent Law Developmentst
Harold C. Wegner'
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") 1 and
the Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") 2 were discussed in Session IV of the conference in
great detail. I would like to spend about ninety seconds going over
GATT and TRIPS.
There were some holes pointed out in protection for various
intellectual property in the GATT and TRIPS context. In GATT
and TRIPS, we are looking at developing countries; we're really
not so concerned about First World countries in the GATT and
TRIPS context. As Professor Reichman noted in Session IV, countries will find a way to weasel around the wording of treaties, and
it is only when countries develop to a level of self-interest in having strong intellectual property rights that they will implement the
features of GATT and TRIPS. If they'll do that in their own selfinterest there is really no need for a treaty for those countries.
The two areas of subject matter protection which Professor
Reichman very properly brought up, that we have to consider are
computer software and biotechnology. I am, indeed, interested in
following computer software technology. It's not an area of special

I This speech was presented at the Fordham Conference on International Intellectual
Property Law and Policy Conference held at Fordham University School of Law on April
15-16, 1993.
* Professor of Law and Director, Intellectual Property Law Program, George Washington University National Law Center, Washington, D.C.; Northwestern University, B.A.
1965; Georgetown University, J.D. 1969.
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1948).
2. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, GAT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991), Agreement On TradeRelated Aspects Of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade In Counterfeit Goods
(Annex III).
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expertise for me. I have been influenced to a large extent by people like Mike Kirk and two of our adjunct faculty members at
George Washington University, Paul Salmon and Jeff Kushan, who
work for Mike, and by Emery Simon. They seem to have found
no need to take special measures in the GATT and TRIPS for computer software.
You also have another member of our adjunct faculty, Professor
Richard Stem, who is proceeding with a very different approach
than either Professor Reichman or Professor Samuelson, but he sees
a need for stronger protection.
You heard from Professor
Reichman already. And then, to turn the circle back to the beginning, Arthur Miller, in the March issue of the Harvard Law Review, wrote about Anything New Since CONTU,3 and he seems to
adhere to the first line-the Emery Simon line-that we do not
need these revisions.
But, computer software is very important. I, myself-just as a
matter as a public citizen-will be studying this in great detail in
the next year. I encourage you to do that also.
I want to put into perspective the importance of foreign patents.
If we're looking at supporting American "R & D," if we're looking
at what President Bush, what President Reagan before him, and
what President Clinton and U.S. Trade Representative Mickey
Kantor are saying-that foreign trade is important-what are the
important countries in the patent world? According to my "Top
Ten" list, we have a listing of U.S. patents granted to foreign nationals. This gives you some sort of an idea of inventive activity,
commercial activity, relevant activity.
Now, what stands out first and foremost is that if you take
43,000 American patents for the 187 foreign countries of the world
and those comprising the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") and subtract only one of these countries, you add up to
about 19,000 U.S. patents of foreign origin. Of those 187 countries, Japan has 23,000 patents; all other nationals have 19,000.
3. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs, Databases, and
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977
(1993).
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So, if we are going to make meaningful approaches to the developed world, to the technology world, it's not enough to say,
"Well, there are many important countries and they're all equal.
There are the many countries of the European Patent Convention,4
and there is Japan, and that is only one country." Japan is of major direct importance and we should deal with the Japan situation.
What is happening in Japan? A lot has happened in Japan.5
Remarkable changes are taking place right now as we speak, this
month. The Diet should havepassed this week, a major new patent
bill that will become effective January 1, 1994. Examination standards retroactive to pending cases are being implemented right now
r
as we speak.
I see five major developments in the Japanese patent law at this
time. First, if we turn the clock back ten years ago, we saw a
Japanese patent enforcement system which I would call a "Swiss
cheese system.",6 In the patent world, you claim the outer periphery of your protection; one claim will define the generic scope of
an invention. A "Swiss cheese claim" has holes in it. The Japanese patent system ten years ago had major holes in the claims
system. So, in other words, you may have a broad claim-for
example, General Electric had a claim to man-made diamonds.7
Remember, in 1954 they had done the closest thing to what an
alchemist could do to synthesizing gold; they made diamonds.
Wasn't that a remarkable feat? They had broad generic coverage.
But some of the modes of making the diamonds were not preferred,
according to the patent. General Electric lost'a patent infringement
suit against Komatsu Diamond, even though they had literal coverage. That would never happen today. Japan has gone away from
"Swiss cheese" and they have nice "Wisconsin cheese," solid

4. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, Munich, 13 I.L.M.
270.
5. See Harold C. Wegner, International Patent Law Developments 1 (Apr. 15, 1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property,Media & Entertainment Law Journal).
6. See Harold C. Wegner, PatentLaw Simplification and the Geneva Patent Conven-

tion, 14 AIPLA Q.J. 154, 158 (1986).
7. See TETSU TANABE & HAROLD C. WEGNER, JAPANESE PATENT PRACTICE 15 (1986).
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cheese. To a great extent, they now don't have holes in their
claims.
They have also moved in the direction of the doctrine of equivalents. These are tentative steps. They have moved toward some
broadened protection.
In biotechnology, progress has been remarkable. Whereas the
United States has floundered around with the tissue plasminogen
activator (t-PA) lawsuit, Genentech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation
Ltd.,' still on appeal, in Japan already a year or more ago Toyobo
has been shut down by Genentech in the Osaka District
Court 9 -remarkable speed. Also, Monsanto never received a judgment in the United States in St. Louis ° in their Roundup ® pesticide
patent litigation. 1' The settlement in the United States was triggered by their victory in Japan after nine months in court. So there
are remarkable changes in Japan.
In the United States, we had a massive, amorphous doctrine of
equivalents under the Markey court. Today, the doctrine of equivalents, more and more, is being viewed as an exceptional remedy,
particularly for copying. So we are moving together in these areas.12

Although I was the first proponent of a claims provision in the
WIPO Patent Law Harmonization Treaty 3 ("WIPO Treaty")-and
you can see this in an article back in 1986 in the American Intel8. 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (D. Del. 1990).
9. See Japan's Court Rules Toyobo Infringed U.S. Medical Patent, Japan Economic
Newswire, Oct. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Asia Pacific Library, JEN file.
10. See Monsanto Co. v. EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Mo. 1983), vacated sub nom.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); see also Monsanto Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 753 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1985).
11. See EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552.
12. See Harold C. Wegner, Equitable Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to Determine PatentInfringement in Biotechnology and Other Emerging Technologies, 18 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1 (1992).
13. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Diplomatic Conference for the
Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention as Far as Patents Are Concerned, The Hague, June 3-28, 1991, The "Basic Proposal" for the Treaty and the Regulations, WIPO Doc. PLT/DC/3 (English) (Dec. 21, 1990), Notes on the Basic Proposal for
the Treaty and Regulations, WIPO Doc. PLT/DC/4 (English) (Dec. 21, 1990), History of
the Preparations of the Patent Law Treaty, WIPO Doc. PLT/DC/5 (English) (Dec. 21,
1990).
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lectual Property Law Association QuarterlyJournal14 -- now I don't
think that is any longer necessary for the United States vis-A-vis Japan.
The second remarkable change is the total gutting of the utility
model. Professor Reichman has properly indicated that countries
with marginal protection may have utility model laws and may
provide inferior protection. As of January 1, 1994, the Japanese
have gutted the utility model law. They haven't abolished it; but,
in the Japanese fashion, they have maintained it in a way that it has
been gutted.
First, you will no longer be able to have both utility model and
patent protection. 5 Second, the utility model provides a six-year
protection, which is next to nothing for any modem innovation.
So, they have gutted the utility model law.
Third, they are instituting a post-grant opposition as part of
their law. But, this has been taken out of the recent revisions. It
is being held until the U.S. moves on patent harmonization.
Fourth, and for those of us in the pharmaceutical/biotechnology
area the most important of all, they have, in their own self-interest-not because we are bashing, not because we want them to do
it, but because the big Japanese pharmaceutical industry wants to
do this-they have gone away from their hypertechnical rule for
"working examples." In the old days, until now, the Japanese
patent, with broad generic protection in the chemical or biotechnology area, was very difficult to obtain because the patent examiner
would say, "In order to entitle you to a very broad scope of protection, you must have many working examples; you must go into the
laboratory and make example after example after example." Now,
one example will do it. This is retroactive to pending cases. Why
is it retroactive? It is a "guideline," not a formal statutory change.
It is also because the Japanese pharmaceutical industry wants it, not
because we're telling them to do it. Fifth, Japan has been tired of
the U.S.'s bashing. Now, we do have some relevant complaints,
but there have also been some ridiculous things said in the Senate
14. Wegner, supra note 6.
15. See Wegner, supra note 5, at 8.
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hearings which have no correlation to reality. Japan is simply tired
of this. They are now retaliating-and they've got a beauty.
One of the things that the U.S. Government has been bashing
Japan about is found in Article 16 of the WIPO Treaty. In Article
16 of the WIPO Treaty, we say the pendency periods of patent
applications should be cut down-"Look, Japan, we do our patent
applications in eighteen months. You do it in many years." That
eighteen-month figure is bunk; it's a lie. Ron Wyden held hearings
in March of 1989; it was all exposed. But we continually go to
Geneva and say, "You Japanese do not get your pendency down."
Why is our pendency figure a lie? It's because we have phony
bookkeeping. The U.S. patent examiners curtail prosecution early
on and refuse to enter any amendments to a patent application, and
they force the refiling of an application, chaining continuation after
continuation. So the net pendency may be, in biotechnology, fifty
months from first filing to grant. It's not twenty or so months, the
way some people in the Group 180 Biotechnology Section of the
Patent Office are saying, based upon only the last link in the chain.
So what did the Japanese do? They initially had a two-part
reciprocal anti-American provision: "Let's get back to a provision
which curtails amendments at an early date and permits continuation chaining." But then, they put the screwdriver into the bill a
little bit more, and took out the continuation provision. So now,
for cases filed on or after January 1, 1994, if you fail in your Japanese application to have proper claims after the first go-around, the
second go-around is final. You're dead, no continuation.
Now, this is a ticking time bomb, because it is only going to be
effective for cases filed on or after January 1, 1994. So, to the
extent that there is cooperation between Japan and the United
States, it will be taken out before the first cases reach the examination stage.
This is a new era of hardball. I suggest that we should maintain our criticisms of Japanese practice where they're valid, but, we
should be a little bit more careful about what we're doing and not
make stupid, wild charges which have no basis in reality.
What about first-to-file? Mr. Montalto, we know we need first-
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to file.' 6 If you haven't read the blue book from Sweet &
Maxwell 17 in Europe, that's available, that's our blueprint as to
what we are going to do to Europe and with Europe. We know we
need first-to-file. We will have first-to-file, thank you. I realize
only the Philippines and the United States do not have it. We will
have first-to-file.
We will have also a bilateral arrangement with Japan. It is
important that we have a bilateral arrangement with Japan because
U.S.-Japan patent trade is so important. We waste'so much effort
in duplicate examination of applications between the two countries,
it's a self-evident truth to me that we will have a common system
with Japan. Japan will add to their present law a grace period, and
several other things that we need.
What will that do? By having Japan and the United States get
together and have a common, substantive and procedural patent
law, we will move to what I introduced last April 30th in the Joint
House-Senate Hearing8 on Harmonization as "PWT"-the Patent
Worksharing Treaty.'
What is PWT? As of today, an applicant in any country will
file at home; then, at the second stage, twelve months from the
filing date, just as today we file in foreign countries within the oneyear Paris Convention deadline, we will file a Patent Worksharing
Treaty application, which may be no more than saying in our home
country case, "Please convert this into a Patent Worksharing Treaty
application." Then that application will stay at home. You should
have the freedom to elect any of the offices of the PWT. At eighteen months from first filing, a publication will be caused by the
PWT office, and there would certainly be a Japanese language
publication in Tokyo, an English language publication in the United
States, and then there would be a grant-all done by one patent
office. Isn't it foolish to have several patent offices examining the
same subject matter? Why should we have parallel procedures?
16. See Wegner, supra note 5, at 5.
17. SWEET & MAXWELL'S EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TREATIES (4th ed. 1980).
18. Patent System Harmonization: Joint Hearing on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before
the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary with the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 478, 487 (1992).
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Why should we have two examiners doing the work of one? Every
patent office is being choked with too many applications. Certainly,
every corporate patent department budget is being strained to the
limits. The last thing a big U.S. department needs is to have multiple foreign prosecutions when they could do everything at home.
We complain about not getting our Japanese patent rights soon
enough. If we had PWT, we could push our rights at home in the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office.
What about national sovereignty? That's an important point.
Certainly, an American company would not be happy to have the
Japanese Government grant U.S. patent rights. Well, we have
taken care of that also. At the end of the grant in the one patent
office, for every PWT office, eventually, Europe also, there would
be a local opposition. A nine-month period would provide plenty
of time to lodge an opposition. I would estimate that the same
statistics would apply as at the European Patent Office ("EPO").
Eight to ten or twelve percent of the cases would be locally opposed. So that is one balancing factor.
Now, what about Europe? Have I forgotten about Europe?
Don't I like Europe? I love Europe. I have spent a lot of time at
the Max Planck Institute. I love going to Paris; I've been there
about fifty times. What about the Germans? Don't they have a
common self-interest? Don't the French have a common self-interest-to have a treaty? To be sure they do; they absolutely do.
But the problem is Dublin, Athens, Copenhagen, and Lisbon.
Where there are six thousand plus applications for patents in the
United States from Germany, several thousand from France, and so
on; from Lisbon there are two; Athens, one-not one hundred-just
one; Copenhagen, 1, 2, 3, or something like that.
Why has the European Community patent never come into
being, and why will it not be an effective treaty when it does come
into being? One thing that has not been explained is that the Community Patent Convention 9 has never been accepted in its full

19. Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, Dec. 15, 1975,
Luxembourg, 15 I.L.M. 5.
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scope by the smaller country legislatures. So, yes, the Community
Patent Convention will come into effect; but, unless you have protection for all of the EPO states, it's optional, and I cannot imagine
anyone using the treaty. Well, maybe Boehringer, Hoechst, and
maybe ICI will have one or two cases that they will put in to the
system so that the system isn't a total embarrassment. I think it
would be malpractice if someone were to tell his clients that he
wants to have an EPO-Community Patent Convention patent-put
all of his eggs into a new basket. If the Europeans won't use it,
why should we use it?
There is no way I can see that the national legislatures of the
smaller European Patent Convention states agreeing either to a major regional treaty like the Community Patent Convention, or to a
WIPO-type treaty on harmonization. So that's why I have not spoken about Europe so far. The Europeans will have to solve their
own problems. 20
Now, what about Europe? What will we do? In large measure,
we will have substantial harmonization with Europe by Japan-U.S.
solution or other unilateral reforms. Really, the only pieces to the
puzzle that will not be found in the European system will be the
grace period and freedom from self-collision, a technical doctrine.
But overall there will be substantial harmony.
What will we do in the United States to benefit from parallel
European examination, and what will we do to encourage Europe
to join the WIPO Treaty? The one-word answer is "piggybacking."
We will simply jump on the back of the European examiner. We
will let him do the work for us.
How will piggybacking work? There is a statutory requirement
in the European Patent Convention that there will be a complete
search eighteen months from the filing date. Every patent application will be searched eighteen months from the filing date-an
excellent search. The European search, to me, is the best in the
world. They have a treaty-based corps of career examiners in The

20. A test case now pending at the European Court of Justice considers whether the
EEC may compel adherence to treaties of this type.
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Hague doing a brilliant job of searching patent applications. We
will simply let the European search be used in the U.S. By regulations, we will have the U.S. search only after the European search.
We will piggyback.
As we move toward harmonization, through unilateral action or
other action, then we will be able to even better benefit from the
European search. In other words, if a U.S. examiner or a Japanese
examiner can take up a case for action after the European search,
much of the job, is done.
That is exactly what I propose that we do. So I propose that
unless an individual applicant wants to accelerate an examination
in the U.S. or Japanese office, examination wouldn't be taken up
until twenty-four or thirty months from the filing date. In other
words, you'd have eighteen months within which the Europeans,
under their treaty, are forced to do their search, and we would piggyback. We would be able to bleed off the search results of the
European office.
Now, what dynamic impact would this have? This would certainly be unfair-that, I would be the first to admit-it would be
very unfair. Hopefully, this would lead Europe toward moving
finally to the treaties which the small states are blocking. Certainly, as part of any treaty at that time, Germany, France, and the
major countries would have their way, and then Europe could participate in this kind of a treaty arrangement.
What do I think about WIPO? Well, if you look at my background, I was the only American private-sector delegate to the first
five sessions of the committee of experts, starting in 1985. I've
been a great proponent of harmonization, first-to-file, really for the
twenty years since I've been at the Max Planck Institute. I respect
and admire Dr. Arpad Bogsch, the WIPO Director-General.
What was important about the WIPO Treaty, more than anything else, was that we had meetings, year by year, which were
great learning sessions. The first meeting was in 1985. It was
defensive: "Well, our law is this way and we don't want to change
our law. Our way is this way, and it's maybe a little better; maybe
it's not, maybe it is." There was a largely defensive attitude.
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By the third session, in 1987, there was clearly a collegial atmosphere. You had largely the same delegates coming to all the
meetings. It was remarkable that the key players from the major
countries remained pretty much the same throughout this period.
By 1987, it wasn't, "Well, this is the way we do it," but more
"This is exciting! Look, you do this this way, we do it this way;
maybe we can synthesize something new or see what's best." By
1987, we had already accumulated literally thousands of sheets of
intermediate and final documents, pink-sheeted documents, and we
had a model code.
In 1987, Canada took this model code right off the bat. Canada
unilaterally bought off on the model code and, by 1989, had a
complete unilateral implementation of pretty much what is in the
1987 draft WIPO Treaty.
So that has been the great benefit of the WIPO Treaty. The
diplomatic conference has been postponed, which gives us more
time in the United States to gain a common understanding. We
have a lot of divergent viewpoints that have come up since we had
the hearings before Congress in April-last year.
Do we have a chance for a WIPO Treaty? Well, I think it
would be nice, but I don't think it is of primary importance because, again, if it requires implementation by Europe as well as
Japan and the United States to come into being, Europe will kill
the treaty.
Now, I recognize that there is the possibility of a Directive
from the Commission to compel WIPO Treaty approval by the
several states. I fail to understand the basis for a Directive to force
each of the states to change their law. I have studied this in great
detail over many years. It would certainly be encouraging to hear
words from the Commission that they could do this, but I really
question whether that would be the bottom-line result.
Where is the leadership in the United States to create these
changes with Japan? Right now, there are two key leaders, Dennis
DeConcini, the Senator from Arizona, and Representative William
Hughes, your neighbor from New Jersey. They chair the respective
Senate and House subcommittees. As we speak, their staffs are
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working on the 1993 model of a harmonization bill. The original
goal was that a bill would be out and hearings would take place by
June. That goal was premised upon a July diplomatic conference.
With the July diplomatic conference being put out of the way, there
is no such pressure, but I would expect that sometime this year a
bill will be introduced and there will be hearings.
Now, we have one piece of the U.S. puzzle that is missing: the
U.S. Commissioner of Patents. Yesterday, Emery Simon said that
by this morning Bruce Lehman would be announced by the White
House as Commissioner. I thought that he had it in the bag three
weeks ago and called to congratulate him. Nothing has happened. 21
Bruce is the former head of Kastenmeier's staff, basically, very
solid in copyrights, with some good friends in biotechnology, including David Beier, now Vice-President of Genentech, who was
a successor in the House subcommittee.
Let us discuss the question of the North American Free Trade
Agreement and GATT. If we have GATT, the possibility exists for
immediate harmonization.
The fast-track authority-the mechanism where the President
proposes a trade treaty to Congress-includes the provision that
domestic implementing legislation once introduced to Congress is
part of the package; you can't take a comma out of that package.
Congress has three months to say yes or no, without amendment.22
So it is very possible, if you have a GATT and TRIPS agreement,
that there will be substantial harmonization as part of GATT and
TRIPS. The scope of the legislation will depend to a large extent
upon who the Commissioner will be. Bruce Lehman may be expected to take a realistic look at the situation.

21. [Eds. note: On April 23, 1993, the White House finally announced his appointment.]
22. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1988). The fast track authority
allows the executive branch to negotiate agreements with foreign nations while limiting
Congressional involvement to a vote on the consequent agreement without allowing any
amendments.

